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I
The contemporary fi nancial system can be presented as permanently increasing in its size and complexity of networks. The informa� on revolu� on provided completely new opportuni� es for unlimited growth which seems to be out of any control. The enormous profi ts the contemporary fi nancial systems provide for a rela� vely few benefi ciaries (Bogaci et al., 2011) is strongly accompanied by the growing level of systemic risk. Experiencing the number of systemic instabili� es, fi nancial authori� es and supervisors discuss their origins and ways of avoiding the next crunches. In the following sec� ons, a� er discussion of the nature of systemic risk, a profound diagnosis of complex, strongly coupled network systems is provided. A� er that, some issues about modelling and management of fi nancial networks are to supplement the current state of knowledge. The main purpose of the paper is to discuss the background of systemic instabili� es in fi nancial networks (Acemoglu et al., 2015) . The key issue is to emphasize that exis� ng methods of systemic risk management could no longer be fully applicable. Nowadays much more a� en� on should be focused on the new risk drivers, not fully recognized, and deeply hidden behind the nodes and links of fi nancial networks. Ignoring the networked nature of fi nancial systems one can be surprised, the whole system can stop behaving correctly even if apparently every single cons� tuent performs its best. The main fi ndings of the paper suggest that strong and s� ll unrecognised fi nancial interconnectedness plays a crucial role not only in transmi� ng fi nancial shocks (as they were regarded so far) but also, what is more frustra� ng, in origina� ng them.
T
Risk is typically quan� fi ed as the probability of occurrence of adverse events, or obtaining results diff erent from planned goals. Following that concept, risk could be thought of either as a threat or as an opportunity. The general defi ni� on of risk does not take suffi ciently into account the rela� ons between objects being exposed to risk. The independent characteris� cs of every single object leads to the concept of specifi c (idiosyncra� c) risk. The vola� lity of a company's profi ts, caused by changing management structures, technology failures, strikes, limited demand for produced goods or other factors are characteris� c for that par� cular en� ty and has nothing (or li� le) to do with other companies, even if they contribute to the same sector. Watching the risk from the perspec� ve of the system (a set of objects, being characterized with common features) requires dis� nguishing the concepts of systemic and systema� c risk (Carr, 1996) from unsystema� c risk.
The term 'systemic risk' is generally addressed to an event that can trigger a collapse in a certain industry, economy or other system. Systemic risk does not have an exact defi ni� on, but generally can be described as a risk caused by an event at the fi rm level that is severe enough to cause instability in the whole system. Typically, the interest of systemic risk analysts focuses on the extreme nature of the events star� ng the systemic instability (referring to not only the unusual scale of the unfavourable phenomena, but also their unpredictability) and the way it spreads all over the system. Systema� c risk, on the other hand, does have a more recognized and universal defi ni� on. Some� mes denoted as 'market risk', systema� c risk derives from general market vola� lity that cannot be limited by diversifi ca� on. Some common sources of systema� c risk are recessions, wars, interest rate fl uctua� ons and others that cannot be avoided through a por� olio eff ect. Though systema� c risk cannot be limited by diversifi ca� on, it can be hedged. The concept of systema� c risk can be directly opposed to unsystema� c or idiosyncra� c risk. It refers to the risk that is specifi c to a fi rm or industry and can be solved by diversifi ca� on. The further discussion undertaken in the paper focuses par� cularly around the concept of systemic (not systema� c) risk concerned as the key source of systemic instability.
I
Regarding the concept popularized by the famous futurist Alvin Toffl er (Tofl er, 1997) we are nowadays carried by the third wave of the storm aff ec� ng human history. All the waves have been dis� nguished due to informa� on criteria. Tofl er asked the ques� on of what made people rich during the various periods of history and what was the role of informa� on in those days. The history started with the fi rst wave, based on natural resources -par� cularly on the areas of the land. As "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 3 Tomasz Zieliński
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The ar� cle is an eff ect of the project -"Financializa� on-impact on the economy and society"-interna� onal conference, conducted by the University of Informa� on Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic educa� on programme agriculture was the main source of his well-being in those days, man had to possess or rule over big spaces of land. With the passage of � me, more and more people aspired to wealth. Unfortunately, total resources of land were stable. Consequently, the poten� al for further dynamic growth became limited. People started to look for other drivers of well-being. Their a� en� on was drawn to manufacturing. They started to think about what to do, to make it more eff ec� ve and profi table. In those days, most of the scien� fi c eff orts were focused on inven� ng new technologies providing more eff ec� ve produc� on tools. Consequently, the second wave of the storm was carried out by industrial revolu� on and capitalism, replacing the falling agriculture-based feudalism. The desire to become wealthy could be accomplished with suffi cient resources of produc� on capital. A bigger and be� er equipped factory could give an entrepreneur advantage over his compe� tor. And again, during the course of the years, that driver of advantage started weaken. Technology and eff ec� veness of produc� on could s� ll maintain the moderate pace of growth, but couldn't trigger a new "Big Bang". Gradually people started entering the third wave dis� nguished by a new approach to informa� on (Wojtyna, 2001 ). Owing to the ongoing informa� on revolu� on, new extremely eff ec� ve tools for informa� on processing became accessible. In condi� ons of diminished eff ec� veness of land, labour and capital, informa� on started to be informally the most promising and encouraging fourth factor of produc� on. The new economy is promo� ng the development of those industry sectors which involve informa� on components. Even if the fi nal product requires contribu� on of land, physical labour and produc� on capital, they are o� en outsourced (nowadays mainly to China, India and other Asian countries), whilst the local economy is expected to provide most of the informa� on components. A spectacular example of such phenomena is the dominance of services (Tapsco� et al., 2011) requiring by default a rela� vely bigger contribu� on of knowledge and skills over tradi� onal produc� on, coupled with strong demand for tradi� onal resources.
As aforemen� oned, the expansion of the postindustrial economy was triggered by the informa� on revolu� on. Inven� on of the personal computer was a symbolic beginning for decentraliza� on of data processing. But from the perspec� ve of the present � me, the most signifi cant impact on the new economic and social order was made by network technology and in par� cular by inven� ng the Internet. For that reason, nowadays the society of global informa� on is characterized by increasing interdependency, interconnec� vity and complexity. On one hand, globaliza� on, leveraged by network technology, enables the exchange of people, goods, money, informa� on, and ideas, which has produced many new opportuni� es, services and benefi ts for humanity. At the same � me, however, the underlying networks have created pathways along which dangerous and damaging events can spread rapidly and globally. This has increased threats of systemic risks.
Closer insight into the concept of systemic risk can refer to the model of the system composed of a huge number of interconnected components. In such a system, systemic risk is usually considered to have a 'cascading', 'domino' or 'contagion' eff ect derived from strong connec� ons between network nodes. In such a case an ini� al failure could have disastrous eff ects and cause, in principle, unbounded damage as the number of network nodes goes to infi nity (May, 2006) . Strongly interconnected, complex dynamic systems cannot be understood by the simple sum of their components' proper� es, in contrast to loosely coupled systems. Complex dynamic systems may seem uncontrollable even if every single cons� tuent seems to operate properly. Understanding systemic risk in networks is cri� cal in establishing rules that will eff ec� vely manage it.
T --
At the same beginning of the post-industrial, informa� on dominated age, trends such as globaliza� on, increasing network densi� es, decentralized (sparse) use of produc� on resources, higher complexity of economic processes, and an accelera� on of ins� tu� onal decision processes have been considered extremely benefi cial for the economy and for other aspects of social life. However, with the passage of � me, people started to discover that those factors may ul� mately push man-made systems towards systemic instability (Haldane, 2009) . Par� cularly fi nancial networks, rela� vely separated for a long � me, now become strongly interdependent (Maier, 2012) . This has made them much more vulnerable to abrupt failures. Systemic risk could mean the possible collapse of a fi nancial market or of the whole fi nancial system. "With the fi nancial market around the world so interconnected, "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 3 Tomasz Zieliński
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The ar� cle is an eff ect of the project -"Financializa� on-impact on the economy and society"-interna� onal conference, conducted by the University of Informa� on Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic educa� on programme thy analysis of "networks" in the fi nancial system would help deepen understanding of systemic risk and is key to preven� ng future fi nancial crisis." (Financial Networks …, 2014) Actually, the fi nancial system should be considered as an even more complex structure than only a network of simple objects. More o� en it should be modelled as a network of networks which denotes coupling of diff erent kinds of systems. In such systems, extreme vulnerabili� es result not only from the increasing interdependencies between individual systems, but also from their internal complexity (Allen, 2008) . Strong interdependencies in a 'hyper-connected world'' shi� ed the level of perceived risk, establishing a new category of 'hyper-risks'. It inevitably leads to a state in which things will get out of control sooner or later.
For the past decades a growing number of abrupt distresses in fi nancial systems could be observed. Due to prior experiences, poli� cians and regulators want to iden� fy the off enders outside the system or to blame par� cular objects inside the system. However, nowadays, many disasters in anthropogenic systems cannot be perceived that way. They are o� en results of inappropriate interac� ons rather than external or internal impulses. That requires a paradigm shi� in thinking about systemic risk in fi nancial systems. Common in former � mes, the component-oriented perspec� ve should be nowadays replaced with a network-oriented view.
What makes the behaviour of complex fi nancial systems par� cularly unpredictable is that systemic failures may occur even if everybody involved is highly skilled, highly mo� vated and behaving properly, even if the fi nancial subsystem is composed of well-behaved components, described with variables normally distributed around their equilibrium state. But connec� ng them strongly with others may nevertheless cause cascade eff ects and extreme distor� ons of outcomes.
A few years before the fi nancial meltdown of 2007 Warren Buff e� warned that massive trade in fi nancial deriva� ves would create mega-catastrophic risks for the economy. In the same context, he spoke of an investment ''� me bomb'' and of fi nancial deriva� ves as ''weapons of mass destruc� on'' (Buff e� warns …, 2003). Five years later, the fi nancial bubble imploded and destroyed trillions of stock value. During this � me, the overall volume of credit default swaps and other fi nancial deriva� ves had grown to several � mes the world gross domes� c product. But what exactly caused the collapse? In response to the ques� on by the Queen of England who asked why nobody had foreseen the fi nancial crisis, the Bri� sh Academy concluded: ''Everyone seemed to be doing their own job properly on its own merit. And according to standard measures of success, they were o� en doing it well. The failure was to see how collec� vely this added up to a series of interconnected imbalances... Individual risks may rightly have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a whole was vast.'' (Hennessy, 2009 ).
The case of fi nancial crisis outbreak could be referred to a category of crowd disasters. In terms of amplifying feedback eff ects, even if any individual wants to harm anybody else, people may be fatally injured. The interac� on strength increases with the crowd density, as people come closer together. When the density becomes too high, inadvertent contact forces are transferred from one person to another and add up. The resul� ng forces vary signifi cantly in direc� on and size. Turbulent waves cause people to fall over each other star� ng a fatal domino eff ect. Very o� en the instability is created not by strong individual ac� ons, but by the unavoidable amplifi ca� on of small fl uctua� ons above a cri� cal density threshold. Consequently, crowd disasters cannot simply be avoided by policy, aimed at imposing 'be� er behaviour' of individuals.
D

Contemporary
fi nancial systems cons� tute a par� cular exemplifi ca� on of anthropogenic systems, highligh� ng an increase in structural, dynamic, func� onal and algorithmic complexity. Considered as a system of systems (Gandi et al., 2015) , they transfer the output variables of one system to the inputs of other ones via various types of channels (Zieliński, 2013) . This poses many new and big challenges for their opera� on, durability, reliability and effi ciency. They derive par� cularly from an unusually powerful cascade eff ect (domino eff ect, avalanche eff ect, fi nancial contagion eff ect) star� ng most of the studies about systemic instabili� es (Zieliński, 2013) . Cascade eff ects are due to local failures of nodes or links between them which may trigger overloads and consequen� al failures of other nodes or links. What make things worse, as aforemen� oned, abrupt systemic failures may result from interdependencies between networks or other mechanisms carried by various "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 3 Tomasz Zieliński
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The ar� cle is an eff ect of the project -"Financializa� on-impact on the economy and society"-interna� onal conference, conducted by the University of Informa� on Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic educa� on programme channels. Unfortunately, the same channels cons� tute the ways through which unwanted shocks might also be transmi� ed star� ng the process of contagion. Financial contagion occurs when a shock to one or a group of fi nancial markets, countries, or ins� tu� ons, spreads to other markets, countries, or ins� tu� ons (Pritsker, 2000) . The nature of contagion is not profoundly examined. Neither the nature of contagion channels, nor the key characteris� cs of par� cular objects in fi nancial networks are unambiguous enough to diagnose clearly the ways systemic instability emerges and transmits. The only thing taken for granted is the convic� on that cascade eff ects are the rule rather than the excep� on in today's economy and therefore systemic risk is a key concern for ins� tu� ons responsible for overall fi nancial stability. Happily, some drivers of systemic instability can be pointed out as worthy of par� cular a� en� on (Helbing, 2013) .
Changes of parameters in fi nancial systems are o� en fast and poten� ally outstripping the rate at which one can learn about system behaviour, or at which one can react. It is related to the strong � me-varying, not sta� c nature of fi nancial networks. "Sta� c networks are a useful star� ng point, but future research should allow for � me-varying risk in networks, that is, risk that varies over the business cycle." (Financial Networks Key …, 2014) In sparse and linear systems, small and gradual changes of variables cause usually gradual and also small changes in response. But not the same in complex and dense systems. Due to the strongly coupled and complex structure of fi nancial networks, sudden failures such as rapid deteriora� on of performance or crisis outbreaks are a very likely response t, apparently not very signifi cant incoming changes. Disasters may result from discon� nuous transi� ons in response to even very small and gradual changes in parameters. That rapid an event can occur at a certain threshold (� pping point, breaking point), the point at which a series of small changes or incidents become signifi cant enough to cause a larger, more important change and set diff erent system proper� es (Georg & Minoiu , 2014) .
The systemic reac� on to small changes can be amplifi ed due to highly correlated transi� ons of many system components or variables from a stable to an unstable state, thereby driving the system out of equilibrium. Addi� onally, cascade eff ects are carried through nonlinear channels. Unfortunately, both correla� on ra� os and nonlinear characteris� cs of transmission channels in fi nancial systems are extremely dynamic. That makes modelling eff orts o� en totally aimless. "The essen� al problem is that our models -both risk models and econometric models -as complex as they have become, are s� ll too simple to capture the full array of governing variables that drive global economic reality. A model, of necessity, is an abstrac� on from the full detail of the real world. In line with the � mehonoured observa� on that diversifi ca� on lowers risk, computers crunched reams of historical data in quest of nega� ve correla� ons between prices of tradeable assets; correla� ons that could help insulate investment por� olios from the broad swings in an economy. When such asset prices, rather than off se� ng each other's movements, fell in unison on and following August 9 last year, huge losses across virtually all risk-asset classes ensued." (Greenspan, 2008) The combina� on of nonlinear interac� ons, network eff ects, delayed response and randomness may not only increase sensi� vity of fi nancial systems to small changes, but also lead systems to numerous diff erent behaviours, depending on the respec� ve ini� al prerequisites. Moreover, the diversity of the goals pursued by the fi nancial system come also from the confl ict of interest (a natural factor of compe� � ve rela� ons) occurring between fi nancial ins� tu� ons, fi nancial markets and other par� cipants in the fi nancial system
The vulnerability of complex fi nancial systems to gradual and small imbalances is o� en neglected. Apparently, as long as risk factor changes stay within a limited boundary, risk management systems seem to easily cope with it. That wishful approach, due to the above men� oned strong internal couplings, is only par� ally realis� c. To make ma� ers worse, a more intui� ve diagnosis, that mostly extreme events are perceived as the main source of instabili� es and that they are easy to control, is also misleading. Even if those extreme events are expected to be external (by default more predictable), they are very hard to diagnose and forecast due to limita� ons of EVT (Extreme Value Theory) . One of them refers to the 'heavy tails' feature of sta� s� cal distribu� ons describing the empirical behaviour of many parameters. To make ma� ers even less unambiguous, extreme events emerge o� en from inherent system dynamics rather than from unexpected external stresses.
Network systems may be o� en automa� cally and inevitably driven towards a cri� cal point. Las� ng for a long "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 3 Tomasz Zieliński
The ar� cle is an eff ect of the project -"Financializa� on-impact on the economy and society"-interna� onal conference, conducted by the University of Informa� on Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic educa� on programme � me, an unjus� fi ed gradual growth of stock indexes will defi nitely trigger a rapid breakdown. Gradual, and longlas� ng increase in popula� on of poor people, leads for sure to unrest and revolu� ons. The experience for many emerging economies of gradual growth of prices (infl a� on) nearly always ends up with collapse of the economy. Gradual growth of indebtedness, a� er exceeding a certain � pping point, nearly always leads to insolvency. All of these are caused by internal posi� ve feedbacks which are o� en diffi cult to diagnose.
One of the most signifi cant factor increasing the systemic complexity of fi nancial systems is a high pace of innova� ons. For instance, the spread of fi nancial deriva� ves (i.e. credit default swaps) transferring risks from the individuals or ins� tu� ons to others , thereby encouraging excessive risk taking, drove the whole world into fi nancial instability. "In recent years, the pace of change and innova� on in fi nancial markets and ins� tu� ons here and around the world has increased enormously as have the speed, volume and value of fi nancial transac� ons. The period has also seen a greatly heightened degree of aggressive compe� � on in the fi nancial sector. All of this is taking place in the context of a legal and a regulatory framework which is increasingly outdated and ill-equipped to meet the challenges of the day. This has led to…concern that the fragility of the system has increased, in part because the degree of opera� onal, liquidity and credit interdependency has risen sharply." (Corrigan, 1987) Each of the aforemen� oned factors poses threats to the systemic stability of fi nancial systems, but excep� onally dangerous could be the reac� on to their combina� on. Probabilis� c cascade eff ects in real-life systems are harder to iden� fy and understand than determinis� c rela� onships between 'causes' and 'eff ects' observable in sparse and small networks. The real -life proper� es of complex dynamical systems are o� en surprising and counter-intui� ve.
T
For the purpose of descrip� on and assessment of fi nancial systems, analysts o� en refer to modelling techniques providing a stylised refl ec� on of the real world. Facing the problem of complex, network structures, they typically use some simplifi ca� ons. One of the most common is the representa� ve agent and equilibrium approach.
An economic model is said to have a representa� ve agent if all agents of the same type are iden� cal. Tes� ng that strong limita� on economists some� mes say a model has a representa� ve agent when agents diff er from each other, but act in such a way that the sum of their choices is mathema� cally equivalent to the decision of one individual or many iden� cal individuals. A representa� ve agent approach enables considering one 'typical' decision maker instead of simultaneously analysing many diff erent decisions.
The representa� ve agent approach is o� en coupled with the equilibrium paradigm According to the equilibrium paradigm, economic systems tend to evolve towards an unambiguously determined equilibrium state. In such condi� ons, bubbles and crashes should not happen. Any instabili� es could be caused exclusively by external shocks.
Representa� ve agent and equilibrium models, assuming that companies act in the way a representa� ve (average) individual would op� mally decide, are more general and allow one to describe dynamic processes. However, such models cannot capture processes well if random events, diversity of system components or correla� ons between variables ma� er a lot. What is more, it does not take into account that interac� ons between system elements can cause amplifying cascade eff ects even if all components pursue their individual equilibrium state. They ignore the domino eff ect. Forcing a system to leave its previous (equilibrium) state, with absence of representa� ve dynamics, the domino eff ect creates various and unpredictable paths of future events. Representa� ve agent models can even make predic� ons opposite to those of agent-based computer simula� ons assuming the very same interac� on rules.
The reasons for the prominence of the representa� ve agent model are excep� onally important due to policy (supervisory) recommenda� ons (Hartley, 1997) . Based on observed past macroeconomic rela� onships, it may neglect subsequent behavioural changes and completely distort the forecast of the systemic rela� ons. This problem could be avoided in models that explicitly describe the decision-making situa� on of each individual agent. The policy recommenda� on could be obtained by recalcula� ng the decision problem of each agent under the new policy rules and then aggregated. However, that approach "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 3 Tomasz Zieliński
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H
As aforemen� oned, most scien� fi c studies make idealized assump� ons such as homogeneous components, linear, weak or determinis� c interac� ons, op� mal and independent behaviours, or other favourable features that make systems well-behaved (see the aforemen� oned representa� ve agent and equilibrium approach). Real-life systems, in contrast, are characterized by heterogeneous components, irregular interac� on networks, nonlinear interac� ons, probabilis� c behaviours, interdependent decisions, and networks of networks. These diff erences can change the ways, one could eff ec� vely manage complex, network systems. The combina� on of complex interac� ons with strong couplings can lead to surprising, dangerous and unpredictable behaviour. Currently most scien� fi c inves� ga� ons of large networks, par� cularly fi nancial ones, are oriented to cases of sparse and rela� vely sta� c networks. However, dynamically changing, strongly coupled and interconnected systems are fundamentally diff erent. Due to the domino eff ect, which determines contemporary fi nancial systems behaviour, the capacity of a fi nancial system to recover is strongly decreasing. It calls for a strong eff ort to stop cascades right at the beginning, when the damage is s� ll small and the problem may not even be perceived as threatening. Otherwise, we could face unpredictable uncertainty rather than measurable risk. That approach seems to be prominent in new fi nancial regulatory frameworks (Georg & Minoiu, 2014) . Cons� tu� ng supervisory ins� tu� ons opera� ng at diff erent levels, such as: Financial Stability Level (worldwide approach), European Systemic Risk Board (the European level) or Financial Stability Commi� ee (Polish safety net) a macro-pruden� al supervisory and regulatory approach started to be promoted besides the commonly adopted micro-pruden� al eff ort (Financial Networks Key …, 2014) .
Their key focus is early detec� on of systemic instabili� es impulses mostly related to systemically important ins� tu� ons.
When systems reach a certain size or level of complexity, algorithmic constraints o� en prohibit effi cient top-down management by real-� me op� miza� on. However, 'guided self-organiza� on' could be taken into account, as a promising alterna� ve way of managing complex dynamical systems, in a decentralized, bo� omup way. The underlying idea is to use the complex system-immanent tendency to self-organize. That is why it is important to have the right channels of interac� ons, adap� ve feedback mechanisms, ins� tu� onal se� ngs and tools. By establishing proper rules, within which the system components can self-organize, top-down and bo� om-up principles can be combined. To overcome subop� mal solu� ons and systemic instabili� es, the obsolete interac� on rules or ins� tu� onal se� ngs may have to be modifi ed.
To cope with hyper-risks in complex systems, it is necessary to develop risk competence and to prepare and exercise con� ngency plans for all sorts of possible failure cascades. The perfect solu� on could be based on providing a backup system. It could be used in case of emergency, ensuring proper (even if not perfect) func� onality according to former rules. Unfortunately, that type of protec� on cannot be explicitly applicable in fi nancial systems. Due to its social nature, it is impossible to preserve the real backup. But it is possible to preserve rules, which could be applied in case of unfavourable events.
One of the most popular ways of managing complex systems, par� cularly fi nancial ones, is diversity. It may signifi cantly increase systemic resilience (that is, the ability to absorb shocks or recover from them) and systemic adaptability. Furthermore, diversity makes it less likely that all system components fail at the same � me. Consequently, early failures of weak system components (cri� cal fl uctua� ons) could provide early warning signals of coming systemic instability. It could allow us to isolate aff ected parts of the system before others are damaged by cascade eff ects. Even if a suffi ciently rapid, dynamic decoupling cannot be ensured, one can build weak components (breaking points, fuses, crash zones) into the system, preferably in places where damage would be compara� vely small. For example, regula� ons aff ec� ng behaviour of fi nancial markets or ins� tu� ons in case of "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 3 Tomasz Zieliński
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The ar� cle is an eff ect of the project -"Financializa� on-impact on the economy and society"-interna� onal conference, conducted by the University of Informa� on Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic educa� on programme displaying unfavourable events could become that type of 'systemic fuses'. Important objects of eff ec� ve management in complex systems refer to the � ming issue. If the system dynamics unfold so rapidly that there is a danger of losing control, one could slow it down by introducing fric� onal eff ects (such as fees or taxa� on of fi nancial transac� ons). In some cases dynamic processes in a system can desynchronize, if the control variables change too quickly compared to the � mescale on which the governed components can adjust. For example, stable hierarchical systems typically change slowly on the top and much quicker on the lower levels of the network pyramid. If the infl uence of the top on the bo� om levels becomes too strong and too frequent, this may impair the func� onality and self-organiza� on of the hierarchical structure. For instance, frequency of regulatory changes for fi nancial systems shouldn't be forced too quickly. Otherwise the delayed and cumulated impact of regula� ons could destabilise rather than stabilise a system .
Signifi cant contribu� on to eff ec� ve management of complex systems could be obtained by its size reduc� on. Contemporary fi nancial systems, with their network based nature, spread all over the word elimina� ng the linkage with real geography. Discussions of separa� on of tradi� onal and investment banking (Acharya, 2009; Benson, 2013) or implementa� on of lean banking strategies (Wancer et al., 2011) , respond to the expecta� ons of more eff ec� ve management. Time required for computa� onal solu� ons explodes with the system size, resul� ng in delayed or subop� mal decisions. Smaller companies or markets could be more predictable and eventually have less exposure to systemic instability. Size reduc� on could be accompanied by limi� ng the internal connec� vity of the system. This implies a change from a dense to a sparser network, which reduces exposure to contagious spreading eff ects and limits the threats of extreme instabili� es.
To achieve be� er risk assessment and risk reduc� on, informa� on transparency, accountability, responsibility and awareness is required (Hull, 2009) . The lack of full informa� on obscures the real picture of the system crea� ng a comfortable posi� on for only a few, who are always in power to avoid unfavourable eff ects. Modern governance some� mes dilutes responsibility so much that nobody can be held responsible anymore. The fi nancial crisis seems to be a good example. It might therefore be necessary to establish a principle of collec� ve responsibility, by which individuals or ins� tu� ons share responsibility for incurred damage in propor� on to their contribu� on in previous and subsequent gains. It might be also advisable to maintain a higher level of informa� on redundancy (reducing at the same � me performance indicators) to improve the system's transparency.
S
Many challenges of contemporary fi nancial systems are posed by social components and cannot be solved neither by technology nor by organisa� onal changes alone. Socially interac� ve systems, be it social or economic systems, ar� fi cial socie� es, or the hybrid system made up of our virtual and real worlds, are characterized by a number of special features, which imply addi� onal risks. The components (for example, individuals) take autonomous decisions based on (uncertain) future expecta� ons. They produce and respond to complex and o� en ambiguous informa� on. They have cogni� ve complexity and individual learning histories and therefore diff erent, subjec� ve percep� on. Individual preferences and inten� ons are diverse, and may imply confl icts of interest. The behaviour may depend on the context in a sensi� ve way. For example, the way people behave and interact may change in response to the emergent social dynamics on the macro scale. One of the key factors of that interac� on is the ability to be innova� ve, which may create surprising and unpredictable outcomes.
To assess systemic risks, a be� er understanding of social capital is also crucial. Social capital is important for economic value genera� on and wellness, but it may be also easily damaged or exploited. Therefore, humans need to learn how to quan� fy and protect social capital. Financial losses in the stock markets during the fi nancial crisis were largely caused by a loss of trust. It is important to emphasize that risk insurances today do not take into account damage to social capital. However, it is known that large-scale disasters have a dispropor� onate public impact, which is related to the fact that they destroy social capital. Neglec� ng social capital in risk assessment, higher risks are taken would be ra� onal.
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Financial networks as a source of systemic instability
The ar� cle is an eff ect of the project -"Financializa� on-impact on the economy and society"-interna� onal conference, conducted by the University of Informa� on Technology and Management in Rzeszów with Narodowy Bank Polski under the scope of economic educa� on programme C When regular interac� on in sparse and small networks are replaced by totally irregular ones, the number of possible system behaviours and proper management strategies becomes overwhelming. There is no one standard solu� on to that. A new approach to perceiving systemic risk in strongly coupled systems implies a fundamental change in the management frameworks. Unfortunately, due to strong rou� ne, we o� en try to implement an obsolete set of measures for inadequate purposes. It is o� en the consequence of a wrong understanding due to the counter-intui� ve and misleading nature of the underlying system behaviour. Hence, conven� onal thinking can cause fateful decisions and the repe� � on of previous mistakes. Nowadays the state of knowledge in the fi eld of systemic risk, par� cularly in fi nancial systems, s� ll seems to have a number of shortcomings. They cover in par� cular:
1) poor es� ma� ons of probability distribu� on and parameters describing rare events, 2) underes� ma� on of the likelihood of coincidences of mul� ple unfortunate, rare events, 3) insuffi ciently considered feedback (especially posi� ve), 4) insuffi ciently covered combina� on of probabilis� c failure analysis with complex dynamics (to understand amplifi ca� on eff ects and systemic instabili� es), 5) underes� ma� on of the human factor, such as negligence, irresponsible or irra� onal behaviour, greed, fear, revenge, percep� on bias, human errors, innova� veness, 6) negligence of social factors such as the value of social capital.
A number of systemic risk limita� ons are due to common assump� ons underlying established ways of thinking. A� empts to iden� fy uncertain� es or 'unknown unknowns' are o� en insuffi cient. Some crises have happened because of a failure to imagine that they were possible, and they must be guarded against. Also economic, poli� cal and personal incen� ves are not suffi ciently analysed as drivers of systemic risks. Many risks can be revealed by looking for stakeholders who could poten� ally profi t from risk-taking, negligence or crises. The key ques� on is: "Cui bono?".
Most of the exis� ng theories do not provide much prac� cal advice on how to respond to global risks, crises and disasters in complex, network systems. Even for fi nancial systems, empirically driven risk-mi� ga� on strategies o� en remain qualita� ve and intui� ve rather than based on strong quan� ta� ve fundaments. The strong conclusion is, despite all our knowledge, much work is s� ll ahead of us.
